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abstract. Neoclassical economics is based on and structured around 
the notion of homo economicus. The theory of consumer choice, the 
theory of the firm, industrial organization, and welfare theorems all 
require the assumption that agents act in accordance with the scheme 
of individualistic rational optimization. In this context, our contribution 
is threefold. First, we delimit the notion of homo economicus according 
to five characteristics or dimensions. Second, we critically review this 
anthropological scheme from five distinct approaches, namely, 
behavioral economics, institutional economics, political economy, 
economic anthropology, and ecological economics. Third, we 
conclude that the scheme of homo economicus is clearly inadequate 
and deficient. However, despite its inadequacies, it remains one of the 
fundamental pillars of the neoclassical paradigm in economics, which 
allows us to discuss why we have not yet overcome this paradigm.
Introduction
The notion of homo economicus—a theoretical construct that posits 
calculated self-interest as the primary human motive in all transac-
tions—has been under heated discussion for decades among econo-
mists. This discussion has also included scholars from several other 
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social sciences, such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, 
and political science. This is not surprising, as neoclassical economics 
is based on and structured around the notion of homo economicus. 
The theory of consumer choice (utility maximization), the theory of 
the firm (profit maximization), industrial organization, the theorems 
of welfare, which together comprise practically the entire neoclassical 
paradigm in economics, require, directly or indirectly, the assump-
tion that agents act in accordance with the anthropological homo eco-
nomicus scheme. Thus, as is pointed out by Trevor J. Barnes (1988: 
477), this notion provides neoclassical economics with a structure:
[It establishes a] methodological agenda [that] reduc[es] the complexity 
of economic events at any time or place to the universal trait of rational 
choice making; a trait that, because of its determinist nature, is easily rep-
resented in a formal model.
The notion of “economic man” goes back to John Stuart Mill, although 
the term itself was introduced by his critics (Ingram 1888). According 
to Mill (1836: 321):
[Economics] does not treat of the whole of man’s nature as modified by 
the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is con-
cerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and 
who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining 
that end.
However, it has been argued by Persky (1995) that the anthropological 
conception of Mill is not as reductionist as is sometimes thought; on 
the contrary, it adapts to various institutional forms and has a wider 
range of motivations than the mere desire for wealth, including lei-
sure, luxury and procreation.
The idea of homo economicus1 that has been adopted and inten-
sively used in neoclassical economics is much more specific than in 
the writings of Mill. It is this restrictive concept that is more relevant 
to review. Once the neoclassical notion of homo economicus is well 
defined, a critical review from five approaches can be conducted.2 
The intention is not so much an exhaustive record of everything that 
has been written about homo economicus. Our aim is rather to select 
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those studies that allow us to discuss in a thorough manner the con-
ceptual delimitation of homo economicus that we propose.
Therefore, our contribution is threefold. First, in the following sec-
tion, the current notion of homo economicus, which is extensively 
used in the field of neoclassical economics, is conceptually delimited. 
Second, in the sections that follow, we present a critical review from 
five approaches, starting with individually focused paradigms and 
moving towards more comprehensive ones. The five approaches are:
• Behavioral economics, based on cognitive psychology;
• Institutional economics, based on a study of how institutions 
influence behavior;
• Political economy, which studies the capitalist mode of produc-
tion and its influence;
• Economic anthropology, as a way of understanding the broader 
determinants of history and culture;
• Ecological economics, which considers the most fundamental 
context of human existence, as part of an ecosystem.
Finally, the most important results of the review are summarized and 
a discussion is introduced about why we have not yet overcome the 
neoclassical paradigm in economics.
The Conceptual Delimitation of Homo Economicus
We begin with a careful definition of the concept of homo economicus 
to enable us to criticize it with greater clarity and explicitness than has 
been done in previous discussions. Our proposed definition is based 
on five dimensions of homo economicus according to the neoclassical 
conception of it:
(i)  Individualism: Individuals only think, decide, and act accord-
ing to their own interests. The scheme of homo economicus 
“assumes that man is atomistically self-interested” (Ng and Tseng 
2008: 279). Some authors have inferred that economic agents are 
unable, according to the self-interest criterion, to concern them-
selves with the welfare of others. But this is not necessarily accu-
rate. Individuals can worry about the welfare of others as far as it 
66 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology
affects their own welfare. According to this approach, if someone 
gives alms, it could be due to the desire to feel noble about being 
a “good person” or wanting to prevent the suffering of others in 
order not to feel bad oneself. In other words, the neoclassical per-
spective posits that there is an individualistic motivation behind 
the actions that we normally consider altruistic (Axelrod 1984). 
Therefore, any moral consideration will not be binding in itself, 
but it would be subordinate to (or would occur exclusively in 
terms of) individual utility maximization.
(ii)    Optimizing behavior: Human beings would be instantaneous 
calculators of pleasures and pains, costs and benefits, and seek 
always to obtain the best result given the means at their disposal. 
Thus, consumer choice theory states that the consumer seeks to 
maximize utility subject to budget constraints, and the theory of 
the firm states that the entrepreneur seeks to maximize profits 
given production possibilities and costs. It is precisely due to this 
that “[i]n practical terms neoclassical economics is able to model 
such determinant behavior by employing the mathematical tech-
nique of constrained maximization” (Barnes 1988: 476).
(iii)  Full rationality: Individuals would have full capacity to prop-
erly process the information available (Simon 1986). This should 
not be confused with the expectation of complete information in 
some neoclassical models, as the homo economicus scheme also 
operates in models of incomplete information. Strictly speaking, 
all that is required is that individuals rationally process all the 
available information. In other words, they must be totally objec-
tive regarding the characteristics of the options from which to 
make a decision, without falling into any kind of cognitive bias.
(iv)  Universality: The universal validity of the postulate of homo eco-
nomicus as a model of behavior is maintained. Thus, it would 
apply to all kinds of events in every time and place. There would 
be no society or individual that can escape from this scheme. 
This has been strongly advocated by Gary S. Becker (1981: ix):
[The] economic approach is not restricted to material goods and 
wants or to markets with monetary transactions, and conceptually 
does not distinguish between major and minor decisions or between 
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“emotional” and other decisions. Indeed … the economic approach 
provides a framework applicable to all human behavior—to all types 
of decisions and to persons from all walks of life.
(v)    Exogenous preferences: Neoclassical economics considers that 
preferences are exogenously given (Bowles and Gintis 2000). 
The agents engage in economic interactions with defined prefer-
ences whose formation process is beyond the scope of econom-
ics. In neoclassical economics, there is also “a conception of the 
human act that is independent of interaction” (Wilson and Dixon 
2008: 245). In this context, it is assumed that agents are consistent 
when they are ordering their preferences; that is to say, prefer-
ences must meet certain mathematical properties: they must be 
complete, transitive, and monotonic.
A Critical View from Behavioral Economics
Behavioral economics can be defined as the approach that aims to 
introduce more realism to economic analysis from a set of more plau-
sible psychological principles. In this way, it seeks to generate new 
theoretical insights, make better predictions of field phenomena, and 
suggest better policies (Camerer and Lowenstein 2004: 3).
In the first stage, Herbert A. Simon (1947, 1955) was one of the 
pioneers in calling into question the supposed full rationality of homo 
economicus. Simon argued that for a proper study of the decision-mak-
ing process, we must consider the cognitive and noncognitive limita-
tions of individuals. For instance, the ability of the human mind to 
store, process, and retrieve information or how it is conditioned by 
the knowledge and experience of the individual should be considered 
as cognitive boundaries in the decision-making process. Moreover, 
individuals do not always develop computational calculations when 
making decisions, which brings us to question the idea of mechanistic 
optimization. Noncognitive factors such as culture, emotions, or im-
itation also bind the rationality of the individual. This is why Simon 
introduced the assumption of bounded rationality in economic mod-
eling, which treats satisfaction rather than optimization as the central 
motivation in the study of rational choice.
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It is not difficult to find other researchers who have also seriously 
questioned the assumption of optimization and full rationality in the 
neoclassical notion of homo economicus. For example, Leibenstein 
(1976, 1978) developed his work on the psychological premise of se-
lective rationality. According to him, individuals do not try to optimize 
among possible options, but choose the intensity with which they 
react to opportunities and constraints based on their personalities and 
external pressures.
In the second stage of behavioral economics, the research program 
developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos N. Tversky in the field of 
“behavioral decision research” attracted the attention of economists. 
These authors, thanks to advances in the field of cognitive psychol-
ogy, questioned the supposed full rationality of individuals through 
their thesis regarding heuristics and biases (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974; Kahneman et al. 1982). They discovered that individuals, when 
making decisions, systematically appeal to heuristics (mental short-
cuts), which allow assessments based on partial data. These cognitive 
shortcuts are used even when they have additional data that would 
enable a more accurate and precise evaluation. Two of the most stud-
ied heuristics by these authors are representativeness and availability. 
On the one hand, the representativeness heuristic is a cognitive bias 
in which individuals make decisions or judgments that are the op-
posite of applying the basic rules of probability. On the other hand, 
under the availability heuristic, individuals tend to greatly skew their 
judgments based on the recency3 or personal relevance of available 
information.
Additionally, compared to the theory of expected utility, which 
models fully rational behavior in situations of uncertainty and risk, 
Kahneman and Tversky developed an alternative critical model, 
which was named prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The 
core of this criticism refers to framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman 
1981). From a series of experiments, these authors demonstrated that 
individuals make their choice of different alternatives depending 
on how the information is presented. For example, individuals tend 
to take more risks to avoid a loss than to achieve a gain—hence, 
the notion of “loss aversion.”  For all of these reasons, the ability of 
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individuals to order their preferences consistently is seriously ques-
tioned. That ability is central to the model of homo economicus.
In the second stage, those who study behavioral economics have 
been particularly critical of the notion of homo economicus. For in-
stance, Nobel Laureate Richard Thaler (1980) describes a total of 10 
types of problems where consumers are particularly prone to deviate 
from the predictions of the normative model of homo economicus. 
He concludes that the neoclassical model of consumer behavior is 
particularly poor at predicting the optimizing behavior of the average 
consumer. This is not because consumers are fools; rather, they do 
not use all of their time attempting to make the best decisions. Other 
behavioral economists have focused more on the critique of individ-
ualism, finding evidence that individuals do not behave in a purely 
self-interested way (see Fehr and Gächter 2000; Henrich et al. 2001; 
Fehr et al. 2002; Miettinen et al. 2017). From the use of experimental 
methods applied to the field of economics (public goods experiments, 
prisoner’s dilemma, the dictator game, the ultimatum game), research-
ers have shown that individuals tend to cooperate voluntarily with 
players who treat them fairly but punish those who do not cooper-
ate—demonstrating the effects of “strong reciprocity.”
A Critical View from Institutional Economics
Institutional economics4 is an approach that focuses on institutions 
(social structures, norms, ideas, values, etc.) in order to understand 
the economy. If in neoclassical economics the “institutional frame-
work” is considered as exogenous, in institutional economics, insti-
tutions are considered not only endogenous but also as constitutive 
aspects of the economic system.
In this vein, the first critique of homo economicus focuses on an 
epistemological issue—methodological individualism. For institutional 
economics, individual subjectivity cannot be consistently understood 
as something prior to “the social world.” Rather, it is always and neces-
sarily constructed from a given set of institutional and social influences. 
In fact, according to Geoffrey M. Hodgson (2000: 327), this idea is 
“the single most important characteristic of institutionalism.” According 
to institutional economists, the economic process “takes place not 
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through the individual, but through the habits of thought, conventions 
and institutions” (Papageorgiou and Michaelides 2016: 14).
Beyond the previous methodological issue, institutional economics 
criticizes the idea of individualism with respect to human motivations. 
Human beings are not simply beings that make transactions in an iso-
lated manner, as they are always part of a society. Faber et al. (2002: 
328) take this into account when they formulate the concept of homo 
politicus, which is distinguished from mere homo economicus by as-
suming that “[h]uman beings do not care solely about their private 
interests in respect of their own individual preferences, but they also 
want to receive the approval from their fellow citizens for what they 
say and for what they do.” But this in no way contradicts the postulate 
of homo economicus, as the individual exhibits “pro-social” behavior 
only to the extent that doing so will gain recognition from the com-
munity, which could well be an individualistic motivation (Alexander 
1987). However, as noted by Faber et al. (2002: 328–329), the issue 
goes beyond this:
This does not mean that homo politicus maximizes consent by any means. 
Homo politicus wants not only to obtain but also to merit the approval 
of others. … To put it differently: human beings consider themselves as 
beings who do have legal and moral obligations and rights.
In another attempt to theorize human behavior in a more socially 
oriented way, Bastien and Cardoso (2007) collected a set of critical 
perspectives on homo economicus that emerged from the corpo-
ratist movement in southern Europe, especially Italy and Portugal. 
This is relevant in the context of institutional economics because, 
as opposed to the individualistic neoclassical scheme, corporatism 
suggests that individual economic agents are not moved by primarily 
individualistic rational motivations; on the contrary, they generally 
cooperate. Interactions are made possible through institutional con-
trol and supervision guaranteed by corporations and the government; 
thus, society is more than a mere aggregation of individual actions 
(Hollis 1987). The concept of homo corporativus differs from homo 
economicus “not only because he is a social being oriented towards 
belonging to communities, but also because he is directed by a notion 
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of social interest provided by both the corporations and the State” 
(Bastien and Cardoso 2007: 123–124). Accordingly, it is the inher-
ently social nature of human beings manifested in and conditioned 
by various institutional settings that makes homo economicus a largely 
nonviable construct in understanding social action or even a single 
economic action, which is always and necessarily also a social action.
Moreover, institutional economics has also criticized the neoclassi-
cal vision of the human being as a mere calculator. Thorstein Veblen 
(1898: 389), father of American institutional economics, described the 
notion of the human being underlined by neoclassical economics as 
outdated given that it sees a person as “a lightning calculator of plea-
sures and pains who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of desire 
of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about the 
area, but leave him intact.” Rather, Veblen argued that human beings 
are creatures of customs, habits, and instincts who are affected con-
tinuously and constitutively by their social context. This was precisely 
what led him to develop notions such as “the instinct of workman-
ship,” “conspicuous consumption,” “conspicuous leisure,” and “pecu-
niary emulation” in his Theory of the Leisure Class (Veblen 1899).
Finally, institutional economists call into question the neoclassical 
idea of exogenous preferences. For instance, Galbraith (1967) argues 
that economists must explicitly study the origin of preferences as 
part of their understanding of the economic system. The neoclassi-
cal assumption of consumer sovereignty is obsolete in a society that 
has the means through marketing and publicity to directly influence 
consumer subjectivity. These means are used in accordance with 
the requirements imposed by the “planning system.” Thus, Galbraith 
(1958) proposes the existence of a “dependence effect,” according to 
which the production system creates the needs it pretends to meet. 
Given this new context of market dynamics and institutions, the rele-
vant matter is to conceptualize consumer preferences as endogenous 
(Bowles 1998).
A Critical View from Political Economy
Political economy can be defined as “the science of the laws govern-
ing the production and exchange of the material means of subsistence 
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in human society” (Engels [1878] 1947: 90). Thus, in classical analysis, 
fundamental concepts involved the study of the economic character-
istics of social classes (mainly workers and capitalists) and the social 
relationships established among them in both the production and 
exchange phases of the economic process. A clear difference is there-
fore established between classical political economy, which focused 
on class analysis, and neoclassical economics, focused on the analysis 
of the isolated individual (i.e., methodological individualism).
One of the most influential authors of classical political economy 
was Adam Smith. A passage in his most famous work, An Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, is often used to justify 
the sort of individualistic and self-interested behavior that underlies 
the notion of homo economicus:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker 
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We 
address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never 
talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. (Smith 1776: 
Book 1, Chapter 2)
However, in an earlier and less known work (The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments), Smith (1759: Part I, Section I, Chapter I) portrays a more 
complete image of human behavior:
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some prin-
ciples in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and ren-
der their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it 
except the pleasure of seeing it. … That we often derive sorrow from the 
sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances 
to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human 
nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though 
they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest 
ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether 
without it.
Adam Smith stressed the importance of context in individual behav-
ior. For example, the rules applied in market-oriented relationships 
among individuals whose values are unknown are different from the 
rules used in other institutions such as the family. Thus, according 
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to Smith, the predominant feature of the market environment is the 
interaction between individuals driven by self-interest; however, this 
does not mean it is the only conduct to guide human behavior. The 
market is part of a larger system of shared social norms to which com-
pliance or noncompliance involves approval or disapproval.
Another particularly influential author was Karl Marx, who under-
stood his work as a critical contribution to classical political economy. 
According to Marx, the notion of economic man corresponds to the 
appropriate description of behavior that has arisen due to capitalism 
(Marquardt and Candeias 2004). Hence, economic man constitutes 
a social construction of the capitalist mode of production, and this 
type of anthropology and behavior would not be “universal”; on the 
contrary, under other forms of social-economic organization, human 
behavior would be different. In communism, “alienation” caused by 
selfishness would not exist. Karl Marx (1859: Preface) explained how 
each type of economic system creates its own mode of thought:
It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but 
their social existence that determines their consciousness. … Just as one 
does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one 
cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, 
on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradic-
tions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces 
of production and the relations of production.
More recently, radical political economy is a critical approach to neo-
classical economics and capitalism that seeks to recover the tradi-
tion begun by the classical economists and Marx. One of its main 
criticisms focuses on the individualistic and optimizing behavior of 
homo economicus, a one-dimensional view that is conceptually insuf-
ficient, given the complexity of problems such as the economic crisis. 
Authors like Tsakalotos (2004, 2005) and Hodgson (2012) agree on the 
need to reinstate moral motivations, values, and social commitment in 
economic analysis.
Moreover, Samuel Bowles has dedicated much of his research to 
the criticism of the neoclassical notion of homo economicus under 
an approach that could properly be named “post-Walrasian politi-
cal economy.” In the Walrasian scheme, preferences and norms are 
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considered as given or exogenous, as is the enforcement of contracts. 
By contrast, in a post-Walrasian model, preferences and norms should 
be seen as endogenous, based on power relationships that allow the 
manipulation of agents and the imposition of asymmetric regulations 
on the market (Bowles 1985, 1998; Bowles and Gintis 1988, 1993). In 
summary, Bowles (1998) proposes a new behavioral foundation for all 
social sciences in terms of three key issues:
(i)  Many behaviors are best explained with social preferences that 
rely on reciprocity, aversion to inequality, envy (or spite), and 
altruism;
(ii)    Individuals are rule-following adaptive agents whose actions 
toward others are governed by internalized social norms that are 
supported by social sanction;
(iii)  Behaviors are context dependent and based on social situations. 
Individual preferences are situation specific and endogenous, 
involving changes over time.
A Critical View from Economic Anthropology
Narotzky (2001) defines economic anthropology as an approach 
that addresses the recurring interaction of individuals—within and 
between social groups and with the wider environment—in order 
to provide themselves with goods and services necessary for social 
reproduction. It focuses primarily on the study of primitive and 
non-capitalist economies.
The formalist-substantivist debate about the universal applicability 
of behavior in a capitalist system to other forms of economy is the 
key aspect regarding the notion of homo economicus. Formalists, 
such as Firth (1967), argued that individual optimizing behavior is 
universally applicable in every time and place. On the contrary, sub-
stantivists, following Polanyi (1957), argued that the neoclassical ra-
tional choice model would only be valid in the context of Western 
market societies. Thus, Polanyi (1944) showed that relationships of 
exchange in most societies and individuals did not historically fol-
low a capitalist pattern. Therefore, in order to implement such a 
pattern of social and economic organization in Western countries, a 
“great transformation” was required along many dimensions. Due to 
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its very unnatural character, the capitalist patterns were met with a 
great deal of resistance and opposition from groups more attached to 
traditional social norms. Polanyi thus showed that homo economicus 
did not produce capitalism but rather that capitalism produced homo 
economicus.
Along the same lines, George Dalton (1961: 20) suggested that the 
differences between the primitive economy and the industrial econ-
omy were substantial and that theoretical schemes derived from the 
latter could not be directly applied to the study of the former:
Primitive economy is different from market industrialism not in degree 
but in kind. The absence of machine technology, pervasive market orga-
nization, and all-purpose money, plus the fact that economic transactions 
cannot be understood apart from social obligation, create, as it were, a 
non-Euclidean universe to which Western economic theory cannot be 
fruitfully applied. The attempt to translate primitive economic processes 
into functional equivalents of our own inevitably obscures just those fea-
tures of primitive economy which distinguish it from our own.
Thus, contrary to what is proposed by Becker (1981), the scheme of 
utility maximizing agents could not be applied to all times and places. 
For example, Elster (1989) explains that rational choice theory does 
not provide a completely adequate explanation for social norms and 
their evolution because rational individualistic behavior is concerned 
with outcomes and, by contrast, social norms are unconditional (not 
outcome oriented).
Therefore, human beings are not merely individualistic creatures; 
they are also cooperative and solidary at a fundamental level. Thus, as 
Sen (1977) points out, individuals not only show sympathy (concern 
for others because their welfare affects ours), they also show com-
mitment (concern for others regardless of how their welfare affects 
ours). It is evident that commitment is not compatible with the homo 
economicus approach.
The neoclassical model is not too complex; on the contrary, it is too 
simple. The mathematical scheme of rationality understood only as in-
dividual optimization cannot consistently capture the reality of choice 
processes that are polyvalent. Choices are conditioned by patterns of 
rationality derived from other dimensions, such as ethics and culture, 
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that cannot be reduced to individual optimization. Hodgson (2012) 
argues that the issue is not simply to incorporate moral considerations 
into the utility function; ethics has its own nature and specificities, 
and humans are generally both morally motivated and self-interested.
Another relevant topic that has been highlighted by economic 
anthropologists is the difference between “market society” and “gift 
society.” In this regard, Mauss (1923) analyzed special exchange cer-
emonies such as the “potlatch” practiced by Native North Americans 
and the “Kula ring” practiced by the people of Papua New Guinea. 
He found that the value of the “gift” was based on the relationship 
between people and objects, whereas in the market society there is a 
remarkable dissociation between people and objects. This issue was 
deepened by Sahlins (1965), who related reciprocal transactions to 
the social distance between people involved. Later, Weiner (1992) 
described how objects can create, sustain, and regenerate social re-
lationships beyond the mere giving-receiving movement associated 
with reciprocity. These kinds of interactions go beyond homo eco-
nomicus and show why it cannot be universal. In fact, the dissociation 
between people and objects—as a specific characteristic of market 
economies—partially explains why capitalist societies are markedly 
more unequal than other societies (Gudeman 2015).
In addition, economic anthropology calls into question the neo-
classical methodological assumption of exogenous preferences. 
Individuals’ decisions cannot be consistently understood by abstract-
ing them from their cultural, sociological, and historical context: “Even 
if our concern is with the provision of material goods, … we must 
deal with activities and structures which, by traditional definitions, 
are religious or social or ceremonial” (Vayda 1967: 87). Therefore, it 
is necessary to endogenously consider factors such as socialization, 
enculturation, and customs ( Jimenez and Garcia 2016).
The knowledge of the wider context in which cultures or societies 
conduct their economic interactions is key to the success (or failure) 
of the development of policies, and it will unlikely be reflected by a 
scheme that considers all these issues as merely “exogenous.”
[M]ost neoclassical economists … seem to know remarkably little about 
the social, cultural, or historical circumstances of the countries for which 
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they are prescribing remedies. … [I]n the paradigms that now dominate 
contemporary economics … there is no place for such “empirical quib-
bles.” (Ferguson 2000: 995)
In sum, economic anthropology broadens the perspective towards 
the study of diverse cultures and societies and finds that the anthro-
pological model proposed by neoclassical economics is highly restric-
tive, deficient, and misleading.
A Critical View from Ecological Economics
Ecological economics can be defined as a heterodox approach that 
explicitly understands the economy “as both a social system, and 
as one constrained by the biophysical world” (Gowdy and Erickson 
2005: 208). It must not be confused with “environmental econom-
ics.” The latter is not a heterodox approach but only a branch of 
applied studies within neoclassical economics. It extrapolates the 
marginalist logic and welfare economics criteria to the environment 
as if it were a mere issue of “externalities” or only a “market good.”
Ecological economics goes beyond the perspective of neoclassical envi-
ronmental economics, which is based solely on preferences and the 
well-being of individuals. Ecological economics does not view environ-
mental and resource problems exclusively as external effects, or as a prob-
lem of public goods, but perceives economy and humans as parts of an 
encompassing ecological whole. (Faber et al. 2002: 323)
Ecological economics differs substantially from the individualistic 
notion of homo economicus. Neoclassical economics conceptualizes 
the environment as fundamentally “external” to the individual who 
perceives it in terms of the logic of consumption (utility) or produc-
tion (exploitation). Instead, the environment in ecological economics 
is seen not as “exogenous” but as constitutive of the identity and exis-
tence of the individuals themselves. Siebenhüner (1999), in his discus-
sion of the anthropological basis of an ecological perspective, relates 
the findings of neurobiology and evolutionary sciences to the fact that 
human beings have feelings of protection or esteem not only for others 
but also towards nature itself. Consequently, the radical dissociation 
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between individuals and the environment, rather than stemming from 
an intrinsic human trait, is something historically conditioned by 
Western capitalist society and the modern processes of urbanization. 
Ecological economics calls into question both individualism and the 
claim of universality in the neoclassical model of anthropology; it pro-
poses a broader analysis in the context of so-called human ecology 
(Steiner 2016).
As for the optimizing behavior of homo economicus, neoclassical 
economics considers it in terms of marginal decision analysis (mar-
ginal utility, marginal product, marginal cost). In this vein, the models 
and theorems of welfare economics are based on several maximiz-
ers interacting “rationally” in order to achieve the maximum social 
welfare (Debreu 1959). Consequently, cost-benefit analysis is applied 
to assess environmental issues assuming “axiological monism” under 
which all objects of utility have some characteristics in common that 
allow them to be compared. However, the environment considered 
as a whole is qualitatively different from any object of consumption 
or particular production factor; consequently, it cannot be coherently 
understood in accordance with the logic of marginal analysis of opti-
mization based on the ceteris paribus condition.
Removing or adding one species to an ecosystem, for example, will 
affect other species and the general integrity of the system in unpredict-
able ways. Furthermore, the effects are likely to be different each time a 
change is made. … In evolutionary systems it is impossible to change one 
thing and hold everything else constant. The existence of qualitative and 
non-marginal change is a powerful argument for rejecting microeconomic 
theory. (Gowdy and Erickson 2005: 215)
The idea of full rationality is also considered within ecological eco-
nomics. Specifically, individuals often fall into “temporary myopia” 
by seeing and arbitrarily preferring the present more than the future. 
This is precisely one of the causes of the current ecological problem. 
Individuals “rationally” seek the maximum benefit of consumption 
from the exploitation of natural resources in the short term; how-
ever, collectively acting in this manner ends up affecting and even 
destroying the availability of resources in the long run. Thus, what 
seems “rational” at the individual, short-term level may not be so 
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at the collective, long-term level. The resulting behavior ultimately 
harms the individuals themselves. Therefore, intertemporal neoclassi-
cal analysis, which uses discount rates to account for the importance 
of future environmental gains or losses, is not only limited but also 
misleading (Georgescu-Roegen 1976; Price 1993).
Some phenomena that are considered “anomalies” in neoclassical 
economics are actually part of the behavior of real agents. For exam-
ple, endowment effects occur when individuals arbitrarily assign more 
value to things because they own them, which can affect the imple-
mentation of specific ecological solutions such as “ecological subdivi-
sion designs” (Magliocca et al. 2014). Another example is hyperbolic 
discounting, which occurs when individuals value the near future 
considerably more than the distant future. Taking this phenomenon 
into account, environmental managers who wish to act rationally 
from an integral perspective must calculate not only the “economic 
time discounting rate” but also the “ecological time discounting rate” 
(Mazziotta et al. 2016). A third example of how individual preferences 
can give highly misleading information regarding social outcomes is 
the part-whole problem. This occurs when individuals value the sum 
of individual parts of an object more than the entire object itself. (For 
example, according to capitalist logic, the value of the trees in an im-
portant ecosystem may be deemed more valuable than the ecosystem, 
which is treated as an “externality.”) To correct this problem, an anal-
ysis in terms of “complex systems” is required in order to understand 
economy in its ecological context (Balmann and Valentinov 2016).
In summary, from an ecological perspective, the neoclassical no-
tion of homo economicus should be questioned. A theoretical frame-
work that considers environmental issues as merely “exogenous” or 
simply as an applied topic cannot be an adequate guide for rational 
action since the rationality of homo economicus can lead to “ecologi-
cal irrationality.” Hence the ecological approach points to a profound 
reformulation of economics.
Such concerns as depletion of the ozone layer, reduction in biodiversity, 
and the destruction of rain forests, to mention only a few of the more 
prominent environmental concerns, are sufficiently removed from the 
sorts of issues with which economists have traditionally dealt that it would 
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be surprising if this body of theory did not require serious revisions to 
deal with environmental policy. (Gintis 2000: 311–312)
Applying the Critiques
As a result of this critical review, the main conclusion to be reached 
is that the scheme of homo economicus is clearly inadequate and 
deficient. However, despite its inadequacies, it remains one of the 
fundamental pillars of the neoclassical paradigm in economics, which 
allows us to question: Why have we not yet overcome this paradigm?
The answer proposed in this discussion is that the notion of homo 
economicus constitutes a theoretical base for the moral and ideolog-
ical legitimation of our whole economic system. According to that 
logic, when individuals behave in a rational and self-interested man-
ner, there is an “invisible hand” that procures the common good. As 
in Bernard Mandeville’s 1714 “Fable of the Bees,” we unconsciously 
assume that private vices become public benefits through the magic 
of the market. From this standpoint, if individuals are rational it is pos-
sible to assume that the whole system is rational.  If a general compet-
itive equilibrium is achieved in free markets, neoclassical economists 
argue that the resources of the society are being used in the most 
efficient way possible. This removes any possibility of ethical or moral 
qualms regarding self-interested behaviors.
Additionally, neoclassical economics has assisted in establishing an 
omnipresent identity between welfare and human happiness by mea-
suring the latter by the indiscriminate multiplication of commodities 
in a capitalist society. This paradigm has valorized the desire for an in-
definite increase in the production of commodities. The gross domes-
tic product (GDP) is a monetized indicator of this idea of progress, in 
which pecuniary values dominate society to the detriment of other, 
more vital values (Naredo 2015: 85).
A contradiction arises in a market society between actual outcomes 
and the expected improvement of general welfare, even in terms of 
the hedonistic principles of neoclassical economics. This contradic-
tion is not only reflected in the food crisis of poor countries but is also 
proven by the loss of quality of life in material and psychological terms 
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observed in the industrial metropolis. If we focus on the United States, 
the enormous increase in the production of commodities since World 
War II has been accompanied by a significant increase in pollution 
and degradation of raw materials and energy resources. Moreover, it 
has not resulted in a significant improvement in basic needs, such as 
food, clothing, or housing.
In relation to food, the profit maximization scheme in a market soci-
ety is placed ahead of consumer health, the livelihood of the American 
farmer, labor conditions of workers, and the natural environment. 
When examining the first issue, a clear setback is observed in the 
quality of the diet consumed by the average American. According 
to Monteiro et al. (2013), numerous food-processing procedures are 
beneficial to human health. Nevertheless, the way in which food is 
actually processed as well as the degree of processing and the reasons 
for it have been revolutionized as an essential part of industrialization. 
Since the mid-19th century, mechanization has resulted in much higher 
efficiency and effectiveness in the manufacture, distribution, and sale 
of food. Nutrient deficiencies have been diminished, and labeling re-
quirements have reduced uncertainty about food ingredients, which 
were initially the main food-related public health problems. However, 
processing later allowed the introduction of foods high in fat and 
sugar, which was followed by increases in cardiovascular disease, at 
first in affluent countries, and then spreading more globally (Omran 
2005). A more recent revolutionary development in the practice of 
food processing (or even ultra-processing) can be seen since the 
1980s. Rapid advancement in food science techniques has facilitated 
the development of an immense array of highly palatable products 
made from cheap ingredients and additives. Transnational food and 
drink manufacturing, distribution, and retailing companies, as well as 
fast food and allied companies, whose profits derive from homoge-
neously branded ready-to-consume products, have grown into titanic 
global corporations. These changes have been accompanied by signif-
icant increases in obesity and related chronic noninfectious diseases, 
most significantly diabetes, mainly in high- and middle-income coun-
tries (Popkin 2002).
In relation to clothing, the apparel industry is another example of 
the contradictions associated with the “benefits” of the market society. 
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Not long ago, there were only two major seasons of clothing per year. 
Currently, every 15 days “fast fashion” retailers change their collection. 
Shopping for clothes has become an entertainment experience: “As 
we do not want to see the same movie twice, when we go shopping 
we do not want to see the same dress twice” (Doeringer and Crean 
2006). That leads us to see consumers constantly disposing of their 
used (or even unused) clothing. Fast fashion is a concept developed 
initially in France to serve markets for teenagers and young adults 
who want trendy, short-cycle, and inexpensive clothing. This philos-
ophy, based on “quick response” and “quick manufacturing” at an 
affordable price, is used by large retailers to allow mainstream con-
sumers to buy current clothing styles at a lower price. The Spanish 
company—Inditex—has been at the forefront of this fashion retail rev-
olution. It has become the global model of how to decrease the time 
between design and production, while simultaneously reducing costs.
However, the ability to change and update clothes and trends every 
15 days has a negative aspect that is important to discuss. Psychology, 
psychiatry, and even marketing have studied an increase in the num-
ber of disruptive behavioral disorders in recent decades. For ex-
ample, “compulsive buying” arises when a consumer experiences 
intense, irrepressible impulses to shop and purchase (Edwards 1993). 
Compulsive consumers are often witnessed engaging in compulsive 
buying practices as compensation for low self-esteem or unhappy 
events (O’Guinn and Faber 1989). The consumer’s self-esteem and 
mood may temporarily be elevated by the act of buying; however, 
this is frequently followed by feelings of disgrace or unhappiness 
(McElroy et al. 1995). There are various repercussions of compulsive 
buying that may lead to family or marital discord, anxiety, frustra-
tion, and financial debt (O’Guinn and Faber 1989). Compulsive buyers 
often have a strong interest in fashion (Park and Burns 2005) along 
with their physical appearance and attractiveness. Fast fashion retail-
ers may be an irresistible temptation if a consumer already possesses 
compulsive buying habits, as the compulsive consumer can rely on 
the knowledge that new and up-to-date clothing products will always 
be available.
The other controversial issue regarding fast fashion involves work-
ing conditions. Apparel is a labor-intensive industry, in which most 
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production jobs are semi-skilled or unskilled, and capital per em-
ployee is relatively low. The United States is significantly handicapped 
in production costs when compared to the hourly compensation in 
China’s apparel industry of less than $1 and approximately $2.50 in 
Mexico. Therefore, the steady increase in imports from labor-abun-
dant countries since the mid-1970s is not surprising (Doeringer and 
Crean 2006). Labor exploitation cases in the United States have also 
increased. Since 2001, workers’ complaints have been based on long 
and exhausting working days: ironing or packing clothing six days a 
week, sometimes 12 hours a day, for far less than the minimum wage. 
In other cases, employees are paid per piece they sew instead of per 
hour, which does not always yield a minimum wage.
Furthermore, fast fashion is environmentally catastrophic. For in-
stance, the link between cotton production and the environmental 
devastation in the Central Asian inland sea has been widely discussed. 
Between 1989 and 2014, the Aral Sea nearly completely dried up. In 
principle, cotton is sustainable in the sense that it is a natural fiber 
produced by plants. It is biodegradable and leaves no trace once 
discarded, and we can always grow more of it, as cotton does not in-
trinsically require resources that we cannot replace. Nevertheless, cot-
ton production is incredibly water-intensive, taking up to 2,700 liters 
to produce a single T-shirt and obtaining competitive industrial-scale 
yields are only possible with precise watering schedules (Chapagain 
et al. 2006). However, the problem does not end at water usage, as 
industrial-scale production of cotton crops requires treatment with 
astonishingly high levels of pesticides and herbicides. Pesticides in the 
United States were estimated in 2014 to cause $9.6 billion of environ-
mental and societal damage annually, and the United States is only the 
world’s third biggest cotton producer, after India and China, whose 
environmental regulations are generally less restrictive (Pimentel and 
Burgess 2014: 47). Cotton production remains the fourth largest con-
sumer of agricultural chemicals, despite the efforts in genetic engi-
neering and other methods to reduce the use of such chemicals.
Finally, when considering the need for housing, we can also report 
significant complications derived directly from “improvements” in a 
market society. The problem arises when the desire for profit maxi-
mization becomes the guiding principle that orders the territory and 
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builds the city. Two phenomena are noteworthy: the pressure im-
posed by market society to grow without limits and the conjunction 
between growth and several models of urban development.
First, growth obsessions force the expansion of cities at rates 
much higher than the growth of population and disposable income. 
Although, cities must grow spatially to accommodate an expanding 
population, too much spatial growth can occur (Brueckner 2000). It is 
not uncommon to observe empty houses in inner-city areas and the 
promotion of new housing in other parts of the city, which implies 
the expansion of towns and cities under the productivist logic that 
prevails in a market society.
Second, these growth processes are implicitly adjusted to two mod-
els that cause increased social fragmentation and greater dependence 
on market commodities:
(a) The urban sprawl model characterizes modern cities. It separates 
and expands in a very inefficient way the different parts of the city 
over a territory, requiring costly transport infrastructure to connect 
them. Thus, as Brueckner (2000) argues, excessive urban expan-
sion means overly long commutes, which generate traffic conges-
tion while contributing to air pollution. Additionally, by spreading 
people out, low-density suburban development may reduce social 
interaction, weakening the bonds that underpin a healthy society.
(b) A model of architectural uniformity is also imposed in the mod-
ern city. Before the advent of capitalism, “vernacular architecture” 
was the norm. It was localized, diverse, and reflected local knowl-
edge, culture, and traditions. It took into account the environmental 
and climatic conditions, such as humidity and temperature, as well 
as the materials available in the region. Market society displaced ver-
nacular architecture with an industrialized architectural uniformity. 
These “non-vernacular architectural” styles, which are relatively 
cheap due to mass production, have made urban dwellers more 
dependent on the consumption of heating appliances or air con-
ditioners that fit perfectly into the logic of capitalist accumulation.
Thus, we can see that the notion of homo economicus and the market 
society that embraces it have created contradictions within three areas 
of basic subsistence: food, clothing, and housing. In each case, the 
scale of commodity consumption has increased, which neoclassical 
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economics regards as the only measure of success. But the triumph 
of quantity has meant a decline of quality of life in many respects. 
For that reason, we need better economic models that can more ade-
quately recognize these contradictions and seek to overcome them.
Summary and Conclusion
The neoclassical scheme of homo economicus is clearly inadequate 
and deficient in portraying the complexity of human behavior. We 
have used not one, but five approaches to criticize the notion of homo 
economicus, which underlies the entire framework of neoclassical 
economics.
• From the study of psychology, behavioral economics has shown 
that there is no perfect rationality or criterion for optimization; 
on the contrary, our perceptions and decisions are systematically 
affected by biases and cognitive limitations.
• From an analysis of the way behavior is shaped by social norms, 
institutional economics has established that we are not isolated 
subjects with given preferences but are constitutively formed by 
norms and social structures. Even our apparent individuality and 
preferences themselves are influenced by social factors.
• From the perspective of social and power relationships, politi-
cal economy finds that individuals do not exist separately and 
independently. Humans exist in social groups or classes within 
a hierarchical scheme. The self-interested nature of homo eco-
nomicus is not universal; on the contrary, it is a social construc-
tion of capitalism itself.
• From the historical study of cultural development, economic 
anthropology calls into question the universality of homo eco-
nomicus by showing that, in pre-capitalist economies, schemes 
of social interaction based on cooperation and solidarity can-
not be reduced to self-interested motivations. The complexity of 
motivation involves deeper and transcendental connotations.
• Finally, from the broader vision of conceptualizing human beings 
as part of a large ecosystem, ecological economics considers the 
environment not as something exogenous that can be addressed 
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as a subsidiary issue in economic theory. Conversely, it should 
be considered endogenous, as something that needs to be con-
sistently addressed from a holistic perspective and not from the 
limited neoclassical scheme.
Despite these critical perspectives, the defense of homo economicus 
remains in force because it legitimizes and rationalizes the function-
ing of the current market society. A series of contradictions have 
emerged in market societies and reveal the pressing need to transcend 
the approach created by adherence to the logic of homo economicus.
The first contradiction involves the hedonistic principles of homo 
economicus, which tie happiness or well-being to consumption of 
goods and services. We seriously question the validity of that con-
nection. As we have shown, the quality of life for the population may 
actually be declining in relation to food, clothing, and housing.
Second, the optimizing logic of production and consumption in 
an increasingly competitive environment of capitalist accumulation 
lowers the price of commodities. In neoclassical theory, this result 
is treated as an indicator of the success of capitalism. However, the 
logic of optimization has also caused the deterioration of working 
conditions and a reduction of the remuneration of the working class. 
The failure of neoclassical economics to address this trend reveals an 
enduring alliance between mainstream economics and the capitalist 
class.
Third, the model of market society in the industrial metropolis (the 
rich nations of the Global North) is not generalizable on a global 
scale. The level of production achieved in these metropolitan centers 
is built on the increasing use of energy and nonrenewable raw ma-
terials. That process can be sustained only through the appropriation 
of energy and the raw materials from countries of the Global South 
and through practices of ecological colonialism, such as operating the 
most polluting industries in their territory.
Finally, ecological economics shows us how the expansion of the 
current model of society and its growing dependence on the degra-
dation of energy and nonrenewable raw materials has already met the 
limits offered by our small planet. Thus, it is becoming more urgent 
to keep in mind the relatively short deadlines for the exhaustion of a 
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whole series of nonrenewable raw materials and the rupture of the 
basic ecological balances that make life on earth possible (Naredo 
2015: 87).
The notion of homo economicus continues to dominate the think-
ing of mainstream economists and, by extension, of other agents of 
the capitalist economy. In order to obtain consistent and genuine 
progress toward a more just and sustainable economy, a multi-para-
digmatic vision is required. We have sought to call attention to several 
types of paradigms that would need to be incorporated in this new 
perspective. More critical knowledge would enable us to construct an 
alternative economics and an alternative economy. We close with the 
inspiring thought of Pierre Bourdieu (1993: 944) that a new world is 
truly possible: “What the social world has done, it can, armed with this 
knowledge, undo.”
Notes
1. Apparently, the first use of the term “homo economicus” (in Latin) is in 
Vilfredo Pareto’s Manual of Political Economy (1906).
2. Following Kuhn (1962), it is understood that an approach or paradigm is 
defined in terms of certain epistemic and axiological assumptions.
3. In cognitive psychology, “recency” refers to the way memory gives 
greater credence to the latest information received compared to earlier data.
4. We have focused on critical contributions of institutional economics as it 
was originally defined. By contrast, the “New Institutional Economics has gen-
erally identified itself as an attempt to extend the range of neoclassical theory 
by explaining the institutional factors traditionally taken as givens, such as 
property rights and governance structures, and, unlike the old institutional-
ism, not as an attempt to replace the standard theory” (Rutherford 2001: 187).
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